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Activist Compensation of Board
Nominees and the Middle Ground
Response
Adam Prestidge *
Shareholder activism has taken an increasingly high-profile and
polarizing role in investin and corporate governance. Moves by
shareholder activists, and the policy behind those moves, constantly
appear in corporate headlines. One of shareholder activists'primary
methods of enacting changes in companies is to nominate directors to
the board, and often those director nominees are hbghly compensated
by the shareholder activist itself Some in the corporate world oppose
this practice, arguing that it creates a signifjcant conflict of interest
and can damage the company fin the short term, while others argue
that the practice is a necessary tool for investors that may actually
lead to a better alignment of interests. Both arguments have strong
merit, which is why companies should evaluate director nominee
compensation plans on a case-by-case basis, and react to them not
with a preemptive prohibition, but with an evaluative middle ground
response.
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* Adam Prestidge is a mergers and acquisitions associate at a major New York law firm.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE PROBLEM
In April of 2013, Agrium, a Calgary-based agriculture supplier,
made corporate headlines when it rejected a slate of directors
nominated by Jana Partners ("Jana"), a hedge fund that owned a
7.5% stake in the Canadian business.1 Prior to the contested vote,
Jana used the weight of its stake to publicly argue that Agrium had
underperformed its peers by 160% over the last five years, and was
badly in need of a strategic shakeup.2 As part of this shakeup, Jana
proposed five nominees for the board of directors, arguing that they
would be more successful at governing the company.3 However,
unlike the incumbent board members, Jana promised to pay its
nominees handsomely by giving them a direct percentage of Jana's
profit on its entire investment in the company. This had the potential
to be many millions more than the $200,000 average annual salary
that the incumbent board members received.4 A public and bitter
proxy fight followed, along with a pushback against the compensation
schemes, with shareholders eventually rejecting all of Jana's
nominees.5  Having failed to elect its nominees, Jana later
6significantly reduced its stake in the company.
A month later, another hedge fund, Elliot Management
("Elliot"), had more success in its activist investment in Hess Energy
("Hess"). Elliot argued that Hess suffered from poor leadership by
I. Ben Dummett & Chester Dawson, Agrium Defeats Jana Bidfor Board Seats, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 9, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/neAs/articles/SBIO0424127887324050304578412881933919870.
2. Steven M. Davidoff, Upping the Ante in a Plai for a Stronger Board, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
2, 2013, http://dealbook.nvtimes.com/2013/04/(P-/upping-the-ante-in-a-play-for-a-stronger-board/.
3. Id.
4. AGRIUM, NOTICE OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS AND
MANAGEMENT PROXY CIRCULAR 33 (2012), available at http://www.agrium.com/system/
files/2012_proxy-circular.pdf.
5. Dummett & Dawson, supra note I (highlighting the bitterness in the fight and touching
on a prevailing attitude toward activist investors, the article quotes an investment banking
advisor to Agrium: "They figured this was another sleepy western Canadian company, and they
were a big New York fund who could scare them to get what they wanted. But their activism is
totally misplaced here.").
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its board of directors, and proposed five nominees for the board.7 A
four month proxy battle ensued, with Elliot eventually settling and
taking three seats.8 However, like Jana, Elliot also had planned to
incentivize its directors by compensating them based on company
performance. Hess publicly and vigorously opposed the
compensation plan for the director nominees, calling it an unusual
scheme to pursue a short term agenda. 9 On the eve of the proxy vote,
facing such strong opposition to the pay plan, Elliot's nominees
waived all compensation from Elliot. Hess treated this as a major
victory, stating that the compensation withdrawal confirmed that this
practice is short term focused and conflicted. 1
B. PROHIBITING ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS FROM COMPENSATING
DIRECTOR NOMINEES
Shareholder activism is on the rise, and one of the strategies that
both Jana and Elliot attempted, and one that has caught on with
hedge funds and activist investors generally, is the lucrative
compensation of director nominees (referred to in this paper as
"sponsor compensation"). Although the practice is relatively young,
it has engendered staunch opposition from corporations, academics,
and leading corporate law firms.
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, and Katz, a leading corporate law firm,
has written and touted a model company bylaw that would ban the
practice. 1  Several large corporations, including Marathon Oil,
Eastman Chemical, and Halliburton have adopted a similar bylaw
prohibiting it.>' Law professors have captured the animus against it
7. Jim Polson & Bradley Olson, Hess to Add Elliott Nominees to Board, Ending Proxi
Fhzht, BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com /news/2013-05-16/hess-to-add-
elliott-nominees-to-board-ending-proxy-fight.html.
8. Id.
9. Press Release, Hess Corporation, Leading Independent Governance Experts and a
Proxy Advisor Raise Concerns Over Elliott Pay Scheme (May 2, 2013), available at http://
phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c-10I80I&p-irol-newsArticle&ID-1814507&highlight-.
10. Elliott's Hess Board Nominees Waive Compensation, CSP DAILY NEWS (May 13,
2013), http://www.cspnet.com/industry-news-analysis/corporatenews/articles/elliotts-hess-board-
nominees-waive-compensation; Press Release, supra note 9 (describing the compensation plan
as scheming "short termism at the expense of all shareholders").
11. See discussion in Part V.
12. David Gelles, A Debate Over Paiing Board Nominees of Activist Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
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by flatly stating: "If this nonsense is not illegal, it ought to be. , 13 John
C. Coffee, Jr., professor of corporate law at Columbia University, was
quoted by Hess in its campaign against Elliot's director compensation
plan, and summarizes the seemingly urgent fight against activists'
director pay: "Today, we are at the crest of an immense slippery
slope. If legitimized, these new compensation tactics will likely be
used in a broad range of control and proxy fights, with the long term
result being a shift towards greater risk and leverage."14
The purpose of this paper is to weigh in on this debate by giving
due credit to the solid policy arguments put forth by both sides and by
suggesting how corporate boards should react to activist-compensated
nominees. Recently, the topic has received significant attention from
business news outlets, usually with observers taking firmly opposed
positions. However, few commentators have attempted to
comprehensively discuss the positive and negative policy implications
of allowing or banning this practice, and even fewer have suggested
and described an evaluative middle ground approach, as this paper
does.
Part II of this paper will set the context and describe the rise of
activist investing, how activists move for changes within corporations,
and how their compensation packages are set up for director
nominees. Part III will discuss the strong, grounded policy arguments
that each side employs in campaigning for or against sponsor
compensation. Looking at current data, Part IV examines the
outcomes from the 2012 and 2013 proxy season to determine how
corporate shareholders in general might view this issue. Finally, Part
V makes the argument that when facing activist investors who
nominate board members, corporate boards should not adopt a broad
ban of sponsor compensation. Instead, they should consider director
compensation schemes on a case-by-case basis, through a suggested
Nov. 25, 2013, http://dealbook.nvtimes.com/2013/11/25/a-debate-over-paying-board-nominees-
of-activist-funds/.
13. Stephen Bainbridge, Can Corporate Directors Take Third Party PaY From Hedge
Funds?, PROFESSOR BAINBRIDGE (Apr. 8, 2013, 9:51 P.M.), http://www.professorbainbridge
.com/professorbainbridgecom/213/04/can-corporate-directors-take-third-party-pay-from-hedge
-funds.html.
14. John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholder Activism and Ethics: Incentives or Bribes?, THE CLS
BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 29, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/04/29/shareholder-
activism-and-ethics-are-shareholder-bonuses-incentives-or-bribes/.
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evaluation framework, and possibly respond with a middle ground
defense.
II. ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
A. THE BROAD RISE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Activist investment has become a major force in American
corporate governance. s  Corporate executives and shareholder
activists largely expect shareholder activism to increase, with hedge
funds leading the way.1 6 In a survey of over 250 corporate executives
and shareholder activists, fifty-two percent of respondents expected
shareholder activism to somewhat increase over the next year, and an
additional twenty-six percent expected it to increase significantly.
Highlighting the driving force behind activist investment, seventy-
four percent of respondents expected an increase in activism to come
from hedge funds. 7 However, as an established investment strategy,
activism is not limited to hedge funds, with increased activism
expected from other major institutional shareholders, including union
funds, pension funds, and mutual funds. 8
Additionally, although it has first caught hold among U.S.
institutional investors, shareholder activism is shifting from an
American corporate trend to broad global strategy. 9 This shift is
15. Stephen F. Arcano, Activist Shareholders in the US. A Changbin g Landscape, THE
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. Gov. & FIN. REG. (June 28, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2013/06/08/activist-shareholders-in-the-us-a-changing-landscape/ (noting that "company
boards and their managements need to be aware that virtually any company is a potential target
for shareholder activism").




18. Id.; see also GOODWIN PROCTER, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PROXY CONTESTS
(2013), available at http://www.goodwindirectorsforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Final
_Shareholder-Activism.pdf.
19. David Gelles, Activism is Going Global, Citi Karns Clients, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013,
http:// dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/ 10 /31 activism-is-going-global-citi-warns-clients/ ?src-recg.
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driven by foreign institutional investors who are demanding the type
of returns generated by activism once unique to the U.S.-0
Activist investing is also spreading across different industry
sectors. The strategy has held a strong foothold in the energy, retail,
and technology industries, but recently has expanded to industries
that were not previously targets of activist investors, such as banking
and finance, which have become more conducive to activist strategies
with stabilizing markets. -'
Although viewed skeptically by leery corporate boards and those
who defend them, some argue that shareholder activism can actually
provide an important balance on corporate governance. In the
absence of the threat of hostile takeovers, which have declined in
frequency since the 1980s, some argue that shareholder activism can
check corporate governance and pay practices, and put pressure on
directors to increase stock prices on undervalued stock.>- Indeed,
underperforming corporations are the most frequent targets of
shareholder activism, with activists agitating companies with weak
stock performance, poor growth, or overly conservative corporate
strategy. -3
Activist investors employ a varied strategic arsenal to agitate for
changes that they believe will make their investment in the company
more valuable. To begin, an activist investor, often a hedge fund, will
20. Chad Bray, Ackman Sees Expansion of Activist Investing to Europe, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
29, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/ackman-sees-expansion-of-activist-investing-
to-europe/?src-recg.
21. William Sweet, Shareholder Activism in the U.S. Banking Industri, THE HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. Gov. & FiN. REG. (Dec. 3, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
0013/12/03/shareholder-activism-in-the-us-banking-industry/#more-55758 (noting that jt]he
relative absence of activist campaigns targeting banking organizations over the last several years
may be explained mainly by current market conditions in the industry, which are not conducive
to investor expectations for realizing a profit from an activist campaign against a bank.").
22. Steven M. Davidoff, 4ith Fewer Barbarians at the Gate, Companies Face a New
Pressure, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/w-ith-fewer-
barbarians-at-the-gate-companies-face-new-pressure/; and SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, supra
note 16 (explaining that [d]uring the financial crisis, activists' ability to keep management on
their toes proved most valuable."); see also David Gelles, Boardrooms Rethink Tactics to
Defang Activist Investors, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/11/
boardrooms-rethink-tactics-to-defang-activist-investors/ (explaining that companies can prepare
to defend against activism by assessing and shoring up weaknesses in corporate governance or
financials).
23. Gelles, supra note 19.
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identify a company that it considers to be undervalued or
underperforming its peers. It will then acquire a large stake in that
company, typically between five percent to ten percent, large enough
to be one of, if not the largest, shareholders, but small enough to
avoid tripping the corporation's takeover defenses, such as
shareholder rights or poison pill plans. Once a major shareholder, the
activist has the weight to push for changes in the corporation's
operation and structure in many ways.
One of the primary ways that activists try to convince
management and directors to adopt certain policies is through public
and legal campaigns. These campaigns create dramatic headlines and
attentive media coverage, focusing scrutiny and pressure from across
the business world on the corporation.
In April 2013, for example, Greenlight Capital ("Greenlight")
made waves by pressuring vaunted Apple to issue preferred shares
and distribute cash from its massive corporate treasury. Over a
period of several months, Greenlight released a series of public
presentations, press releases, and even filed a lawsuit against Apple to
drive the change. 25 Eventually, in response to the pressure, Apple
paid out an unprecedented dividend, which Greenlight counted as a
major success. 26
Activists may also forgo the media spotlight of a public campaign
and negotiate with management directly. Dan Loeb, CEO of Third
Point Capital, is known for his sometimes scathing letters to
corporate management, railing at Sotheby's for failing to rein in
spending, 27 pounding Yahoo! for its opposition to his board
24. Michael J. De La Merced, Einhorn Supports Apple s Big Pai out, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/einhorn-supports-apples-big-payouts/.
25. Einhorn Drops Lawsuit Versus Apple, Ends Challenge, REUTERS, Mar. 1, 2013,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/01/us-apple-einhorn-idUSBRE9200SQ20130
301.
26. De La Merced, supra note 24.
27. Agustino Fontevecchia, Billionaire Dan Loeb Blasts Sothebi's CEO for Spending
'Hundreds of Thousands'on Luxuri Lunches, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.forbes.com!
sites/afontevecchia/2013/10/02/billionaire-dan-loeb-blasts-sothebys-ceo-for-spending-hundreds-
of-thousands-on-luxury-lunches/ (quoting Dan Loeb's letter to Sotheby's which blasts
management's "generous pay package and scant stock holdings and a perquisite package that
invokes the long-gone era of imperial CEOs: a car allowance, coverage of tax planning costs,
and reimbursement for membership fees and dues to elite country clubs.").
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nomination, 28 and more gently urging that Sony Corporation spin off
one of its major subsidiaries. 29
This paper focuses on a third approach: activist investors
nominating directors to corporate boards and incentivizing them by
paying sponsor compensation. For activists who decide to nominate
directors in contested elections, that strategy seems to be working. In
2013, analysts expected to see at least seventeen different proxy
contests for the election of directors.30 In the 2013 proxy season,
activists were successful in nearly seventy percent of proxy fights,
establishing director nomination as not only a force to be reckoned
with, but one with a significant chance of victory.
B. How NOMINEE COMPENSATION WORKS IN PRACTICE
Compared with the average director compensation, which in
2013 hit a high of $251,000 annually,3 activist-sponsored directors
stand to reap dramatic additional gains. Often, their sponsor
compensation is tied entirely to the performance of the company's
stock, directly incentivizing the board nominees to improve the value
of the investment owned by their activist sponsor. Compensation
plans may be set up in a variety of ways, paying directors in direct
proportion to the stock value, based on the company's performance
relative to peers, or dependent on achieving certain performance
benchmarks. This is unlike traditional directors, who may be paid a
much more modest salary by the corporation, and may receive a
separate, but relatively small distribution of stocks or securities.
28. Cadie Thompson, Dan Loeb Sends Another Scathing Letter to Yahoo CEO, Board,
CNBC (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/46882463 (criticizing management for
employing "illogical Alice-in-Wonderland" reasoning).
29. Julie La Roche, Here s Dan Loeb s Letter to Soni Calling for a Breakup of the
Compani, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 14, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/loebs-letter-to-
sony-2013-5.
30. Steven M. Davidoff, As Shareholder Fights Heat Up, Activists Aim at Bigger Targets,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/as-shareholder-fights-heat-
up-activists-aim-at-bigger-targets/.
31. GOODWIN PROCTER, supra note 18, at 105.
32. Jeff Green & Hideki Suzuki, Board Director PaY Hits Record $251O00 for 2n0 Hours,
BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-30/board-director-pay-
hits-record-251-000-for-250-hours.html.
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In Elliot's Hess campaign, Elliot proposed five director
nominees. Each would be paid a fifty-thousand-dollar retainer by
Hess regardless of performance, and would be paid an additional
thirty thousand dollars for every percentage point the stock price
outperformed industry peers, up to a maximum of nine million
dollars.33 As discussed previously, this compensation plan met heavy
resistance, perhaps in part from incumbent directors who were
opposed to sharing the board with peer directors who could
potentially receive up to fifty times more than they would for doing
the same job.34 The nominees eventually dropped the pay plan.
In Jana's failed Agrium bid, Jana promised to pay its nominees
the same fifty-thousand-dollar retainer.35 However, unlike Elliot's
compensation plan, the directors' cut was neither linked to peer
performance nor capped at any amount. Instead, the directors would
have received 2.6% of Jana's net profit from its total investment in
Agrium shares.36 Even if not elected, as they were not, the directors
were promised 1.8% of Jana's profit.37 Jana's 7.5% stake in Agrium
was worth approximately one billion dollars at the time, so with
strong stock performance, director nominees could have been in line
for payouts in the tens of millions of dollars.38
Director compensation is not uniform among activists. While
Jana and Elliot pay their directors millions of dollars, other funds,
such as Pershing Square Capital Management, which has held
significant investments in Target, JC Penney and the Canadian Pacific
Railway, maintain a strict policy of not compensating director
nominees directly, perhaps in part to avoid the distracting debate that
comes along with the compensation plan.39
Ultimately, most compensation plans fall into one of two
categories, either being directly aligned with a performance metric or
guaranteed for accepting the nomination. In a presentation to proxy
33. Davidoff, supra note 2.
34. See Part 111(b).
35. Davidoff, supra note 2.
36. Id
37. Id. (noting that Jana's hefty compensation promise, even to directors who failed to be
elected, highlights how difficult it can be for activist investors to recruit potential directors for a
contested seat, and why seemingly extravagant compensation is critical to their model).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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advisers, Jana summarized these two basic alternatives for
compensating directors. In the first, a guaranteed compensation plan,
"[a]n incentive can be structured to have value no matter how the
stock performs, such as by granting a certain amount of stock.5
40
Unlike compensation plans that only pay a cash amount if the
sponsor's investment increases, directors compensated under the
guaranteed compensation plan receive compensation that is inherent
in the value of the stock they receive. This structure does align the
nominees' incentives with stock performance to some extent because
their stock can increase in value, but it also results in compensation to
the director even if the stock value declines, because the director
ultimately still owns valuable shares of stock. Jana argues that this
would effectively compensate the nominee for simply being
nominated, even if the director serves the position poorly.41
Alternatively, by tying director compensation directly to the
activist's financial reward itself through stock performance, "[a]n
incentive can be structured to only deliver value if the share price
appreciates," which rewards the directors only if shareholders
benefit. 4 Under this scheme, if the stock drops and the shareholder
activist loses value in its investment, the directors would receive only
their initial retainer. But if the stock price increased, the directors
would receive a direct cash cut of the shareholder's profits.
Although the variety of compensation plans may incentivize
directors differently, the policy debate among corporations and
commentators generally regards them collectively, when in fact,
incumbent boards should consider whether the type of compensation
could have a significant impact on nominees' behavior.43
40. JANA PARTNERS, SUPPLEMENTAL PRESENTATION TO PROXY ADVISORS (2013)
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/943003/000110465913023600/al3-6908 3ex
99dh.htm.
41. Id. An argument in favor of this model would be that the compensation is not
guaranteed for the simple nomination, which firms have certainly offered much more blatantly,
but for the service on the board, regardless of the outcome. Nominees could argue that this
would free them up to focus on long term value if it is in the best interest of the corporation,
even if it is at the expense of short term profits.
42. Id.
43. See Part IV.
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III. POLICY ARGUMENTS
Proponents of sponsor compensation include the activists and
hedge funds themselves, corporate governance academics such as
Harvard Law School's Lucian Bebchuck,4 and shareholder services,
including ISS Proxy Advisory Services. 45 Opposed to the practice are
many major corporations and the lawyers that support them, most
notably Martin Lipton, founding partner of Wachtell Lipton,46 as well
as another contingent of academics.47 Both sides advance strong
policy points that make it difficult to uniformly accept or reject the
practice without disregarding critical aspects of corporate governance.
A. POLICY ARGUMENTS 1N FAVOR OF SPONSOR COMPENSATION
1. Fiduciary Duties
Any policy discussion should begin with fiduciary duties, which
dominate corporate law. Those observers in favor of sponsor
compensation, including directors themselves, note that all directors,
including those nominated and handsomely compensated by hedge
funds, are bound by the same traditional fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its shareholders. Some director nominees defending
the practice have taken it as a point of integrity that, once elected,
their duty is solely to the corporation and its collective shareholders.
Importantly, Delaware courts have been keenly aware of
fiduciary duties with regard to director compensation. Ever the
sentinel of corporate governance laws, Delaware courts have yet to
44. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al, The Long-Term Effects ofHedge FundActivism, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. (forthcoming June 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id-2291577 (presenting a comprehensive empirical investigation of the claim that
interventions by activist shareholders have an adverse effect on the long term interest of
companies and their shareholders, and finding that the claim is not supported by the data).
45. Martin Lipton, ISS Addresses Dissident Director Compensation Bylawi, THE HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corp
gov/2013/11/21/iss-addresses-dissident-director-compensation-bylaw/#more-55602.
46. Martin Lipton, Empiricism and Experience: Activism and Short-Termism: the Real
World of Business, THE HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://blogs.law.harvard. edu/corpgov/2013/10/28/empiricism-and-experience-activism-and-short-
termism-the-real-world-of-business/.
47. See Bainbridge, supra note 13; see also Coffee, supra note 14.
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see a challenge of sponsored-directors' ability to satisfy their fiduciary
duties. Prevailing case law, however, suggests that if a board's refusal
to allow compensation by activists were motivated by a selfish
attempt to protect its incumbency, the incumbent board itself could
be in breach of its duty of loyalty.48
Part of the reason that even activist-compensated directors are
able to fulfill their fiduciary duties is because they owe those duties to
both the corporation and its shareholders collectively. The activist
investor is obviously a shareholder, so directors can argue that their
loyalty to the shareholder activist's interest is a fulfillment of their
duty to shareholders in general. This has led some commentators,
noting the growing divide between boards and shareholders, 49 to
argue that the duty to shareholders and the duty to the corporation
should be separated.50 But until they are, directors are duty bound to
do their best to protect the best interests of both, and must do so
regardless of outside compensation.
2. Fixed Compensation
Opponents of sponsor compensation argue that directors who
receive special compensation will serve the agendas and special
interests of their shareholder sponsors. But activists and directors are
quick to point out that their compensation schemes are fixed,
meaning that once directors have been elected, they are no longer
beholden to the shareholder to receive that compensation. 1 Their
pay is guaranteed according to an external, quantitative metric,
regardless of whether the director pursues the shareholder's agenda.
If the director believes that the shareholder's strategy is in the best
interest of the company, he or she may pursue it. But, if in
accordance with fiduciary duties, the director believes that another
48. Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A. 2d 651, 658 (1988).
49. James Woolery, The Challenge for Boards, THE HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 24, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/10/24
/the-challenge-for-boards/#more-5425 1.
50. See Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors,
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 309 (2013)(arguing that a default rule should be for constituency directors
to have an undivided loyalty to shareholders, which would allow them to properly advocate for
their sponsors and remove conflicts of loyalty with respect to their duties to the corporation).
51. Davidoff, supra note 2.
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course is preferable, the director can pursue a different strategy.
Either way, the director is guaranteed the same outcome dependent
compensation. Under this structure, the director actually has a much
greater interest to do what they think will increase the value of the
company rather than to simply follow the agenda of an activist.
In Jana's contest with Agrium, for example, Jana noted that the
incentive formula offered to its nominees was "100% formulaic and
[had] no discretionary element."'5 Basically, once the activist has set
its incentive scheme in place, and the director has been elected, the
director's compensation is no longer tied to the approval of the
activist who compensates the director. Whether the activist approves
or disapproves of the director's decisions, the only factor that
determines the director's compensation is the company's stock price.
3. Better Alignment of Interests
The interests of activist compensated directors may actually be
better aligned with the company's performance than other directors
who are guaranteed compensation by the corporation. Most
corporate directors receive a flat salary, regardless of how the
company performs. This creates its own set of concerns, as
incumbent directors may be overly risk averse or unmotivated by the
need for growth, and the flat compensation can fail to align the
interests of the board with that of the shareholders. In order to
properly align directors' incentives with the shareholders, companies
should compensate their outside directors based on company
performanceS3 This gives directors a "shareholding mind-set" and a
"personal financial incentive to examine questionable management
initiatives with the vigorous, independent, and challenging eye of an
owner," rather than incentivizing them to protect only their seat and
their salary.54
52. JANA PARTNERS, supra note 40, at 18.
53. Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Mlanagement-Captured Board-the
History of A Simptom andA Cure, 50 SMU L. REv. 127, 130 (1996) (stating that "companies
should compensate their outside directors primarily in company stock.").
54. Id. at 130-31.
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
Compensating directors with this shareholder-like incentive has
become more popular in modern corporate governance. ss Without it,
boards may run into issues of passivity and a reluctance to challenge
management. 6  Indeed, empirical research has shown a strong
correlation between director stock ownership and more effective
monitoring and board performance.s
This is exactly how activists are incentivizing their board
nominees: in a way that more directly aligns director interests with
the interests of the corporation. s8 By basing compensation on stock
performance, sponsored directors are paid only when the entire
corporation sees its value increase, which benefits all shareholders,
not just activists.5 9
4. Alignment with Shareholder Activist Interests
Even if sponsored directors are attuned to the interests of their
activist sponsors, they actually represent a very important interest in
the corporation that may be more closely aligned with the company's
success. First, shareholder activists sometimes invest longer term
than many other major institutional investors. Many are large
institutional investors, such as public pension funds, which invest in
sectors or indices with little ties to the company itself. Their assets
may be adjusted and relocated according to the fund manager's
55. Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkom 's Legaciv: The Limits of
Ju&cialhi Enforced Constraints and the Promise of Proprietari Incentives, 96 Nw. U. L. REV.
579, 588 (20(P).
56. Elson, supra note 53, at 132.
57. Sanjai Bhagat et al., Director Oiwnership, Corporate Performance, and Aanagement
Turnover, 54 Bus. LAW 885, 891 (1999).
58. An argument could be made that instead of banning shareholder compensation,
corporations should take the opposite approach and compensate all of their directors with a
similar structure.
59. Charles Penner, a partner at Jana, asserts that shareholders recognize the value that
sponsored directors bring the board, noting that investors recognize that "it is often necessary to
get the best candidates possible and that having actual skin in the game is a good thing." Gelles,
supra note 12.
60. See Azam Ahmed, For Activist Funds, a Long-Term Approach to Investing, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010, http://dealbook.nvtimes.com/2010/12/20/for-activist-funds-a-long-term-
approach-to-investing/.
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discretion and timetables, which may sometimes be much shorter
61than the activists'.
Second, major institutional investors employ much more capital
and will have stakes in a wide range of investments, while activists
will spend a much higher percentage of their more limited capital on a
major stake in one company.62 This makes the activist's holding in the
corporation much more critical and may thereby lead to more careful
risk evaluation by the directors it nominates.
Finally, the directors' position on the board or their ownership of
stock in the company may outlast the investment period of the activist
itself, and those directors are likely to be more careful not to risk long
term stability for short term gains.
5 Necessary for Hiring Qualified Directors
Finding and hiring highly qualified directors can frequently be a
challenge for corporations. It can be even more difficult for activist
shareholders, which is one reason why it is necessary for activists to
offer sponsor compensation. 63  Shareholder-sponsored nominees
61. Recently, institutional investors, such as public pension funds, have begun to use their
large investment stakes to influence corporations in ways similar to activist investors. For
example, the California Public Employee's Pension Fund, the largest U.S. pension fund, played
a significant role in the activist-led board shakeups at Chesapeake Energy, Nabors Industries,
and Massey Energy. See Randall Smith, Some Big Public Pension Funds are Behaving Like
Activist Investors, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/28/some-
big-public-pension-funds-are-behaving-like-activist-investors/?_r-0.
62. Consider that two large institutional investors, the California State Teachers
Retirement System and the New York City pension fund, manage approximately $176 billion
and $144 billion in assets, respectively, while Elliot Management, the largest activist hedge fund
discussed in this paper, holds approximately twenty-two billion dollars under management. Id.;
PREQIN, THE PREQIN QUARTERLY UPDATE: HEDGE FUNDS (2013), available at
https://www.preqin.com/docs/quarterly/hf/Preqin-Quarterly-Hedge-FundUpdate _Q3
_2013.pdf.
63. Brandon S. Gold, IKhi the W achtellBlaw on Director Compensation b Shareholders
is Overbroad and lav Fail Blasius Scrutini, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 31, 2013),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/05/31/w-hy-the-w achtell-bylaw-on-director-compensatio
n-by-shareholders-is-overbroad-and-may-fail-blasius-scrutinv/; but see John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Wachtell B lar: A Balanced Perspective, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 31, 2013),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/05/31/the-wachtell-bylaw-a-balanced-perspective/
(arguing in response that director compensation as a whole has "increased enormously over the
last few years" and pointing out that the nominees at Hess waived their sponsor compensation
and were still willing to serve on the board. Coffee further points out that even if nominees are
viewed as being aligned with activists, there are enough insurgent elections each year that the
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know that they are being hired into a hostile environment and will
face opposition from the incumbent directors and the corporation as
it tries to resist the activist's influence, and must be compensated
accordingly.64 Jana notes that, unlike directors who are appointed or
nominated by the board itself, directors who are hired and nominated
by shareholder activists "run the risk of coming under substantial
attack by the company (e.g., being publicly and falsely accused of
riding in on a Trojan Horse or wearing a golden leash or being a
pain)."65 In addition, once aligned with an activist, those nominees are
less likely to be asked to join the boards of other corporations, and
are generally committing to a potentially long and often difficult
process.66 In order to convince highly qualified professionals to take
on such a targeted position, activists must promise them heady
compensation.
Corporations have leveraged this need in an attempt to defend
against activist nominees. When Halliburton passed a bylaw
prohibiting sponsor compensation for directors, it did so recognizing
that the bylaw would make it more difficult for activists to hire good
directors, and would thereby make the corporation more resistant to
activist efforts, because activists would be unable to nominate strong
candidates.67
But this "bar-the-door" approach may harm corporations in the
long run. Shareholder activism is an established investment
approach, and activists will continue to nominate and sometimes elect
directors regardless of whether they are compensated by sponsors or
not. Though the process may be more difficult, eventually some of
those nominees will be elected onto boards, and if they are not
sponsor-compensated, they may not be the most qualified. If a
company bans sponsor compensation for the most qualified
nominees, it may be weakening its own board by forcing the
directors would be able to find another opportunity.).
64. Jack Ferdon, Restrictions on Compensation for Dissident Nominees Encounter
Shareholder Opposition, GLASS LEWIS & Co. (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.glasslewis.com/blog/
restrictions-compensation-dissident-nominees-encounter-shareholder-opposition!.
65. JANA PARTNERS, supra note 40.
66. Id.
67. Davidoff, supra note 22.
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shareholder to nominate less qualified directors, which ultimately
hurts the company.
B. POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST SPONSOR COMPENSATION
1. Directors Have C Tna voidable Loyalty to the Activist
Regardless of the fact that activist-nominated directors are
bound by fiduciary duties, they cannot be considered completely
independent. They are hired, nominated, and championed by the one
shareholder who eventually writes their checks. When directors
receive almost all of the benefit of their position from one source, it is
unlikely that they will be able to completely separate their opinion
from the goals of the activist sponsor.68 Corporations should be
concerned when a director values the interest of one shareholder
above others. Although corporate law has generally interpreted the
director's fiduciary duties as being owed to the common shareholders,
"it is not entirely clear how 'constituency' directors should act when
the constituency's interests diverge from the corporation's
interests. ,69 For example, if a director knows that his or her activist
sponsor would reap faster gains through a particular strategy, it is
unclear how the director should consider that strategy if the long term
outcome for all other shareholders is less certain. It is likewise
unclear whether serving the interest of one shareholder would be
considered to satisfy the obligation to all shareholders.
Not only does this create a potential conflict between the
interests of the activist shareholder and those of the corporation, but
it also creates conflict between the interests and power of other
68. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Alani Alasters Can A
Director Serve:2 A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 Bus. LAW 761, 774
(2008) (noting that "constituency directors do confront real tensions between their fiduciary
duties and the expectations of their sponsors.").
69. Michael K. Molitor, The Crucial Role of the Nominating Committee: Re-Inventing
Nominating Committees in the Aftermath of Shareholder Access to the Proxi, 11 U.C. DAVIS
Bus. L.J. 97, 148 (2010) (also noting that "[w]hile it is true that the constituency director will not
breach his fiduciary duties to the corporation if he acts in accordance with the corporation's
interest (despite whatever anger this may generate among his constituency), what is not clear is
whether he would breach his duties to the corporation if he votes in accordance with the
constituency's interest when it is in conflict with the corporation's long term interests.").
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shareholders.0 Two different shareholders could prefer two different
strategies, and constituent representation of those shareholders on
the board could lead to serious conflict and compromised decisions
regarding company action. Even if the conflict between shareholders
could be marginalized or reduced, the director's conflicted duty
cannot be set aside because corporate law "requires an undivided and
unselfish loyalty to the corporation [and] demands that there shall be
no conflict between duty and self-interest." 1
Ultimately, the issue of whether, and how, an activist-
compensated director can meet his or her fiduciary duties remains
unclear: "[T]he disjunction between the appointment of directors and
fiduciary duties is only sustainable because the purported objective of
fiduciary duty-however formulated in theory-is not clearly defined
at all. "
2. Activist Directors Have Short Term Incentives
Due to the inherent nature of activist investing and the
accompanying compensation schemes, sponsored directors are often
incentivized to focus primarily on the short term stock performance,
which may not be in the best long term interest of the corporation or
other shareholders. Activists argue that directors' interests are
properly aligned if they are incentivized with stock, but this can cause
directors to focus on too narrow a metric of success, and can lead to
the type of agency issues that exist regarding CEO compensation and
risk taking. When director compensation is solely focused on
shareholder value and stock price, it "could lead directors to believe
that their one and only concern should be to maximize share prices as
70. Molitor, supra note 69, at 149 (noting that some commentators are concerned that an
increase in the "power of shareholders will likely (or perhaps necessarily) result in a greater
focus on short term profitability at the expense of the corporation's long terms interests and the
interests of other stakeholders.").
71. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503,510 (1939).
72. Martin Gelter & Genevieve Helleringer, Constituenc Directors and Corporate
Fiduciari Duties 3-4 (Fordham Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2341660), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract id-2341660 (noting that across U.S.
jurisdictions, directors owe a uniform fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders,
creating a heterogeneity of duties with little clarification).
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quickly as possible .... [S]uch a short term focus often does more
harm than good."73
In the Hess and Agrium contests, both companies argued that
the director compensation packages were designed to "incentivize
these nominees to sell the company or promote some other
extraordinary transaction in the short-run."74 This argument is well-
grounded, considering that activist investors will frequently advocate
for a dramatic merger, divestiture, or other shareholder distribution
that can lead to an immediate jump in share value. A director is more
likely to favor such a short term dramatic transaction if he or she is
likely to see direct financial gains from it.
Additionally, incentive compensation makes it more likely that a
director would favor selling the company at a price today even if he
or she would otherwise believe that the company could be worth
more in three years.75 The immediate benefit of a current transaction
can change the time horizon of a director's risk evaluation. For
example, shares of hypothetical ABC Corp are currently valued at
twenty dollars per share. An activist shareholder is advocating for an
acquisition that would likely boost the stock to twenty-five dollars per
share in Year One. However, management believes that the
acquisition could hamper the corporation long term, and that its new
strategy could gradually raise the stock price to thirty-three dollars
per share by Year Three. In board deliberations, a salaried director
who receives identical compensation in Year One as in Year Three
might have the patience to wait for a stock to slowly rise to thirty-
three dollars. But an activist sponsored director, who is guaranteed
to reap millions of dollars from the immediate jump to twenty-five
dollars, might be much more likely to favor the acquisition. The
compensation package impacts the director's evaluation of risk and
73. Molitor, supra note 69, at 114.
74. Coffee, supra note 14 (adding that [t]he great irony here is that the Dodd-Frank Act
restricted incentive compensation to executives at major financial institutions precisely because
such compensation was thought to have led to the short termism and perverse incentives that
produced the 2008 financial crisis. But no one thought about director compensation, which can
do the same.").
75. Id.
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return, increasing his or her preference for short term transactions,
even though they might forego long term opportunity.76
3. Changes Risk Management with the Company
In addition to changing how directors evaluate short term
transaction risk, compensating directors based on immediate
performance changes how risk is balanced within the company itself.
Part of the purpose of paying directors guaranteed salaries is that it
traditionally allows them to be more risk averse than CEOs and serve
as a prudent counterweight to executive ambition. Like the activist-
sponsored director in the ABC Corp hypothetical, ABC Corp's CEO,
whose compensation is tied almost exclusively to stock performance,
is also likely to be more willing to take on long term risk for short
term gain. But the salaried board of directors will rein in that strategy
if they view it as too risky in the long run. However, if the directors
are also compensated based on short term gain, they may be just as
willing to take on risk, depriving the corporation of a balanced risk
evaluation process that is critical for long term stability.77
4. Divides the Board
Another argument against activist compensation is that it may
lead to hard feelings in the board room. Lucrative compensation for
some directors can create two classes of directors on the same board
that do the same job but get paid very different amounts, which can
often lead to resentment and disagreement between directors.78
Ultimately, such conflict within the board leads to losses borne by
shareholders. 7  Although disagreement is likely to exist in many
76. Coffee, supra note 14.
77. Davidoff, supra note 2 ("Relatively modest compensation may ensure that directors act
more prudently and serve as a counterweight to chief executives, who are more willing to shoot
for the moon because their upside is so high. By paying directors as if they were chief
executives, they may become all the more willing to take on more risk.").
78. Id.
79. Ferdon, supra note 64 ("Glass Lewis recognizes that unequal compensation
arrangements- like that proposed by the Hess shareholder- among directors can harm
shareholders by impeding board cohesion and by creating conflicts of interests for directors who
have received supplemental pay from a shareholder in consideration for their board service.").
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board deliberations, personal pay conflicts exacerbate issues because
they "Balkanize the board, creating suspicion and tension," which
limits the board's ability to impartially evaluate a corporation's
strategy. 80
IV. PROXY SEASON OUTCOMES
Outcomes in recent proxy seasons hint that sponsor
compensation is gaining mild approval from shareholders, who may
not share the staunchly opposed position of corporations and their
defenders. Identifying shareholder sentiment about compensation
from this data can be difficult, because election of the activist
nominated directors is often more of a reflection of the shareholders'
opinions about the activist investor in general, not the directors'
compensation scheme. However, as the advisory firm Glass Lewis
explains, "companies' bylaws already require disclosure of any
compensation arrangements maintained by director nominees. So if a
nominee is party to a problematic deal, shareholders can render
judgment on it by voting against the nominee in the director
election." 81 Even though shareholders have the opportunity to vote
against compensated directors, data on contested elections led by
activist investors and on directors who failed to be reelected shows a
trend toward accepting the role of activist nominated directors, and
the sponsor compensation that often accompanies those positions.
A. CONTESTED ELECTIONS
Institutional Shareholder Services ("I.S.S.") has compiled data
on proxy contests by activist investors or dissident groups. Through
the first half of 2013, activist dissidents sought to replace directors in
twenty-four proxy contests, up from nineteen in the similar time
frame of 2012.$ While the frequency of these contests grows, the
activists' success rates are also climbing. In the first half of 2011, fifty-
80. Coffee, supra note 14.
81. Ferdon, supra note 64.
82. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, UNITED STATES 2013 PROXY SEASON
REVIEW 47 (2013), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/library/united-states-2013-proxy-
season-review/.
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six percent of proxy contests by activist dissidents were successful. 83
Through the first half of 2012, the success rate dipped slightly to
forty-three percent.' However, the first half of 2013 saw a dramatic
increase in success, with activists acquiring seats in seventy percent of
elections, with success rates of sixty-four percent in smaller
companies and seventy-five percent in larger companies. Again,
although it is difficult to draw firm conclusions, it appears that
shareholders are becoming more accepting of activists nominating
directors to board seats, and presumably are not vigorously opposed
to the sponsor compensation that those directors often receive.
B. INCUMBENT DIRECTOR REFLECTIONS
Despite significant publicity in early 2013,8' director reelections
during the 2013 proxy season did not reveal evidence that
shareholders are opposed to director compensation for any
incumbent directors. I.S.S. data reveals why certain directors were
not elected, for reasons such as a director's poor board meeting
attendance, approval of exorbitant management pay, or commitment
to too many boards. In 2013, forty-four directors failed to win a
majority of votes in reelection. Of those forty-four, none were ousted
for reasons related to their compensation by shareholders or any
other third party.86 The 2012 proxy season presented very similar
results: forty-six directors failed to win reelection, and none were
ousted due to third party compensation.8
As part of its shareholder advisory service, I.S.S. may
recommend that a director not be reelected. In 2013, the most
frequently cited reason for a negative I.S.S. recommendation against
83. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 82, at 49.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 5 ("Despite dire pre-season predictions of stormy conditions by many pundits, the
2013 Proxy Season proved mild, as most boards basked in the glow of a strong stock market.
The overwhelming majority of director candidates won reelection via landslide margins as
advisory votes on pay continued to siphon off shareholders' angst over compensation matters,
and board outreach efforts dampened concerns over responsiveness.").
86. Id. at 35.
87. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, WORLD MARKETS 2012 PROXY SEASON
REVIEW (2012), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/library/united-states-2013-proxy-
season-review/.
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a director was concern about the director's independence. However,
"[d]irectors in this category received average shareholder support of
ninety percent of votes cast, and no directors who were in this
category received less-than-majority support." 88 This overwhelming
shareholder support "suggests that shareholders broadly do not view
a violation of I.S.S.'s independence standards (which are, in some
circumstances, more stringent than the company's own independence
policies under stock exchange rules) as a significant negative
problem." 89 Additionally, analysis of the 2012 reelections shows
nearly identical results, with shareholders casting strong support for
directors that I.S.S. had recommended against based on
independence concerns. 90 This data is significant because the heart of
the argument against sponsor compensation is that it compromises
director independence, but shareholders seem largely unconcerned
with I.S.S.'s independence recommendations and are perhaps
similarly unconcerned with who is paying their directors or how those
directors are being compensated.
This pattern continued in 2014, when I.S.S. recommended against
768 directors on the basis of independence issues. In spite of I.S.S.'s
negative recommendations, those directors received, on average,
votes of support from eighty-nine percent of shareholders, confirming
that even with the highly publicized issues regarding activism,
shareholders do not seem significantly concerned with director
independence. 91
As owners of the corporation, shareholders should be able to
shape how its board of directors operates. If shareholders are not
opposed to directors' lack of independence or related compensation








91. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2014 PROXY SEASON REVIEW (2014), available at
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/ SC-Publication-2014-Proxy-Season-Review.pd
f.
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practices, then those practices should be accepted as a legitimate
means of corporate governance.
As summarized by I.S.S., the 2013 proxy season was significantly
characterized by activist shareholders' pivot from focusing on
structural governance issues to board member challenges." Yet,
referenda on director compensation by those activist shareholders
stayed outside of the fray. Ultimately, regardless of compensation
packages, shareholders will "vote for who they think is the better for
the company and probably not pay much attention to the
compensation issue .. .[with] performance and assessment of these
companies ... the most pressing point."'  If shareholders are willing
to vote for the directors whom they think will best serve the company,
regardless of their sponsor compensation, perhaps corporations
should be hesitant about adopting bylaws that would prohibit that
compensation.
C. PROVIDENT FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND ADVISOR OPINIONS
In November of 2013, Provident Financial Holdings
("Provident"), a small bank holding company, considered the issue of
whether to reelect three directors to a board that unilaterally passed a
bylaw barring the nomination of sponsored directors. 94  The
Provident case is unique among other companies that have adopted
similar provisions, because for perhaps the first time, the debate for
the reelection of directors was centrally focused on their adoption of
the prohibition, and it received significant outside attention.
I.S.S. came out against the reelection of the directors, arguing
that the board did not take the bylaw change to a shareholder vote.9'
92. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 82, at 5.
93. Davidoff, supra note 2; see also Coffee, supra note 63 (pointing out that when
shareholders elect a sponsored director, the issue of the activist's investment and the directors'
sponsor compensation have been bundled, and shareholders may have merely believed that
their approval of an activist's outside influence outweighed their disapproval of its director
compensation plans).
94. Gelles, supra note 12.
95. Berl Nadler, ISS Adises Against Bi-Law Restricting Shareholder Compensation of
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I.S.S. further focused on the bylaw's deterrent effect on nominating
qualified directors, noting that the prohibition could drive away
"board candidates selected for their strong, relevant industry
expertise" who are affiliated with activist investors.
96
Martin Lipton offered a counterpoint, directly criticizing I.S.S.
for announcing a "one-size-fits-all policy" that would discourage
companies from trying to protect themselves against "inappropriate
enrichment schemes" employed by activists and their directors. 97
Lipton cited the panoply of policy arguments against the practice,
arguing that I.S.S.'s recommendation would promote "fragmented
and dysfunctional boards, conflicted and self-interested directors, and
short termist behavior."98
The reelection was closely watched, and somewhat surprising in
the eyes of some commentators. All three directors were reelected,
but with only an unusually low margin.99 Upon revealing the election
results, Provident defended its prohibitive bylaw, arguing that it
prevented the potential for a board composed of "directors with
distinctly different motivations. "100
The Provident election reflects I.S.S.'s summary of the 2013
proxy season in general, with shareholders willing to overlook
compensation issues in favor of reelecting the directors they believe
are best for the corporation. However, it does show that when
sponsor compensation is a central issue, shareholders may be willing
to reelect directors who ban it, but those directors will not receive the
strong support that they may have received previously.
Ultimately, both I.S.S and Glass Lewis weighed in on the issue.
In a recent FAQ section, I.S.S. adopted a new policy position that
broadly considers the implementation of the bylaw without
shareholder approval as a "material failure of governance", which
96. Gelles, supra note 12.
97. Id.
98. Gelles, supra note 12.
99. David Benoit, Provident Financial Directors Reelected Despite Criticism, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 28, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023040172045792242
00100433792 (noting that the directors were reelected with support of 65.9%, 66.6%, and 66.6%,
which was significantly lower than the last time these directors were reelected in 2010, when
each received more than eighty nine percent of the vote).
100. Id.
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may lead to recommendation of a vote against director nominees.' °1
This announcement was met with the expected consternation of
Martin Lipton, who asserted that I.S.S. was "establishing a
governance standard without offering evidence that it will improve
corporate governance. "10 However, I.S.S.'s position was supported
by Glass Lewis, which separately stated its policy that prohibitions of
nominated director compensation should be put to shareholder vote
and ultimately rejected.0 3 In spite of these pronouncements, many
companies still consider prohibiting sponsor compensation, leaving
the issue still up for vigorous debate. 104
V. CASE-BY-CASE EVALUATIONS AND THE MIDDLE
GROUND RESPONSES
With activism a rising global strategy, and compensating board
nominees becoming a regular practice, Martin Lipton and several
other partners of Wachtell Lipton have proposed a model bylaw that
any corporation can adopt to ban directors from being compensated
by activistst Many corporations, such as Halliburton and Provident,
have adopted the bylaw or others like it. The policy arguments made
in favor of such a proposal are important: in some circumstances,
performance compensation for directors could skew incentives
against a corporation's long term best interests. However, a
corporate board should not disregard the important policy arguments
in favor of this practice and shareholders' apparent tolerance of it.
With these points in mind, boards should scrutinize individual
compensation schemes as they arise, instead of adopting Wachtell's
bylaw and banning the practice outright.
101. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, DIRECTOR QUALIFICATION/
COMPENSATION BYLAW FAQ (2014), available at http://www.issgovemance.com/files/director
qualificationcompensationbylaws.pdf.
102. Martin Lipton, ISS Publishes Guidance on Director Compensation (and Other
Qualification) Bilairs, THE HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 16,
2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/ 01 6/isspublishesguidanceondirectorcompens
ationandotherqualificationbylaws/.
103. Ferdon, supra note 64.
104. Id.
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A. TuE WACHTELL BYLAW
Lipton and his partners frame the potential harm posed by
shareholder compensation: "In order to proactively address the
threats posed by such schemes to the integrity of the boardroom and
board decision-making processes, companies should consider
adopting a bylaw that would disqualify candidates that are party to
any such arrangements from serving as directors."0 6 According to
their proposal, corporations should adopt a universal ban on the
practice that might look like this:
No person shall qualify for service as a director of the Corporation
if he or she is a party to any compensatory, payment or other
financial agreement, arrangement or understanding with any
person or entity other than the Corporation, or has received any
such compensation or other payment from any person or entity
other than the Corporation, in each case in connection with
candidacy or service as a director of the Corporation.
107
This bylaw would prohibit directors from receiving sponsor
compensation in any form: not for hiring, not for nomination, and not
for election. The provision would allow for reimbursement only for
out-of-pocket expenses related to election or for indemnification for
expenses related to service. The bylaw sends a strong signal that the
company will resist shareholder activism by adopting a firm measure
to stop activists from employing an important strategy. As
proponents might argue, this bylaw preserves the fiduciary integrity
and independent decision-making of the board, which would be paid
uniformly by the same entity, the corporation, with clear duties to the
corporation and all of its shareholders equally.
However, the proposal is too new to determine what impact the
bylaw might have on corporations, and it remains to be seen whether
activists might actually be deterred from investing in a company that
has adopted it.
106. WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, supra note 105.
107. Id.
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B. THE CASE-BY-CASE EVALUATION
Instead of adopting a bylaw that preemptively prohibits any type
of sponsor compensation arrangement for activist-nominated
directors, boards should evaluate actual compensation plans should
they arise on a case-by-case basis. This is similar to the case-by-case
evaluation advocated for by I.S.S., which diverges from Glass Lewis's
blanket disapproval." 8 By taking this case-by-case approach, the
board retains the ability to guard against misalignment of interests for
compensated directors, but still allows boards to benefit from
agreeable shareholder activism, which can have a positive impact on
the corporation's bottom line.10 9  When a shareholder activist
nominates directors, incumbent board members are in the best
position to situationally evaluate the impact of having those nominees
compensated by activist sponsors.
1. Evaluation Framework
In evaluating nominee compensation plans, boards of directors
should ask and collectively consider the following questions, in order
of significance:
Question #1: Does the activist shareholder have a track record of
aggressively focusing on short term strategies, which might be
supported by a director nominee'?
Question #2: Do the nominated directors have professional track
records of corporate prudence'?
Question #3: Is the board, in its personnel composition,
susceptible to "Balkanization," or jealousy-based disagreement, if
some of its directors are paid much more than others'?
Question #4: Are the nominated directors likely to retain their
positions for a period that will outlast the activist's investment
period'?
Question #5: Will the compensation method, whether paying for
stock performance only, or for performance relative to peers only,
have an impact on the director's behavior in the current market'?
108. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 101.
109. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 109.
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2. Evaluation Application
Question #1 is the most important, because it considers director
compensation in the context of the greatest concern about activist
investing. Incumbent directors must carefully examine a shareholder
activist's' previous investments and consider whether the activist will
push for a dramatic short-term shake-up, such as a major spin off,
acquisition, or CEO firing. On the other hand, directors may
consider the track record of the investor and see that it has a history
of working in cooperation with management and incumbent boards to
improve value. If the investor has a history of aggressive tactics, and
the board reasonably believes that those aggressive tactics would not
be in the best interest of the corporation, the board should loudly
object to nominees' compensation plans as part of a broader
resistance effort. If the track record is more conservative, the board
might consider allowing the sponsor compensation without protest.
Question #2 employs a similar evaluation of the directors' track
records. Many nominees are former business executives with
extensive experience in corporate leadership.11°  In previous
management positions, have they made risky moves to drive up the
value of their individual stock holdings'? Or have they displayed
greater prudence and conservative management principles'? If the
director was previously willing to take short term risks to maximize
stock value as an executive, it may be highly likely that he or she
would continue that behavior as a director if incentivized solely by
stock value. But if the nominee has a long history of careful decision
making and conservative strategies, then he or she would likely still
satisfy the board's obligation to carefully evaluate risk within the
company.
Question #3 is simply an evaluation of the personality of the
board. Can incumbent directors avoid tension and bias when working
with sponsored directors who will be paid much more'? Although this
may seem like a petty matter of personality conflict, it is critical to the
board's efficiency and effectiveness. If pay discrepancies might create
110. See Joann S. Lublin, Afore Boards Recruit Former CEOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2013,
http://online.wsj .com/news/articles/SBI0001424052702303755504579206262720315806?mod-dje
mCJh (discussing the increased nomination of former CEOs to board positions).
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issues on an already divided board, sponsor compensation plans
should be resisted.
Question #4 considers the nominees' long term commitment to
the company. If the director is likely to remain on the board after the
activist has reduced its stake, the director's interests will be aligned
with a longer term perspective, avoiding concerns about immediate
shortcuts.
Question #5 can have an impact on director behavior depending
on market and industry conditions. In a strong market that creates
growth within the company's industry, a director who is compensated
based on stock price alone can receive gains simply by riding that
market growth without taking risky strategies. While that director
may be able to focus on more conservative, long term strategies, the
automatic gains could also lead to passivity.
On the other hand, in the same strong market, a director who is
compensated based on the company's performance relative to peers
might still be willing to take aggressive strategies, even though the
market is driving the stock price up without resorting to such tactics.
Even if the stock price goes up, that director will not see any benefit
unless the stock goes up more than peer companies', which may lead
the director to take risky measures. Ultimately, it is up to the board
to decide which compensation structure best reflects the risk
approach that is most appropriate for the corporation in its current
market.
C. THE MIDDLE GROUND RESPONSES
Considering these five evaluative questions together should help
boards determine whether a nominee's compensation plan is a threat
to the long term welfare of the company or whether it is unlikely to
have an impact. If the board determines there is a threat that activist
sponsored nominees will pursue short term gains to the exclusion of
long term opportunities, the company should respond to the potential
activist advance in one of two ways.
The first measure, a tactic advocated by Professor John Coffee,
would be for the board to adopt a short term bylaw that prohibits
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sponsor compensation.111 The bylaw could be structured to apply
only in short term situations that might apply to only a single director
election, with a provision that requires any longer term adoption to
be approved by shareholders. This approach would be a strong
deterrent in a particular election that would effectively prohibit the
activist from nominating and compensating directors. However, it
would also avoid the long term downsides to such a prohibition,
allowing for sponsor compensated directors to be elected to the board
once the short-term prohibition expired, provided that the board
approved of the qualifications and compensation of the nominee and
the strategies advanced by the activist sponsor.
The second measure, employed successfully in recent corporate
defenses, is to simply engage in a loud and public campaign against
the activist's compensation plans. Hess successfully used this strategy
in its negotiations with Elliot. When Elliot sought to fill Hess's board
with directly compensated directors, Hess objected to the aggressive
scheme and took its "argument against Elliot's director compensation
arrangement to the airwaves and successfully raised enough questions
to compel Elliot's nominees to waive the arrangements. ""2 If other
companies would employ a similar strategy, it would allow them to
forgo adopting a prohibitive bylaw, but still protect themselves from
short term aggression.
A third, and similar, measure, would be to require all sponsor
compensation arrangements to be fully disclosed.11 3  Such full
disclosure fits well with Hess's strategy to wage a public campaign
and may serve as a deterrent as activists and director nominees may
hesitate to commit to and publicize seemingly exorbitant pay
incentives.
However, some boards may find that it is not necessary to adopt
either of these defensive tactics. Unlike the ambitious strategies
advocated by Jana, Elliot, and others, some activist investors do not
intend to take aggressive action. For example, Clifton Robbins,
founder of activist investor Blue Harbour Group, refuses to invest in
111. Gelles, supra note 12.
112. Gold, supra note 63.
113. Stephen M. Gill et al., Structural Defenses to Shareholder Activism, THE REV. OF SEC.
& COMMODITIES REG., June 18, 2014, at 151, 159, available at http://www.velaw.com/
uploadedFiles/VEsite/Resources/GillLiekefettWoodRSCR_061814.pdf.
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a company unless its management is receptive to his suggestions.11 4 In
such cases, it makes less sense for a corporation to firmly resist the
activist's board nominees' compensation with either a short term
bylaw or public campaign. If the activist investor does not pursue an
unruly risky strategy, it is unlikely that the activists' directors will. In
such cases, corporations should consider ceding seats to avoid the
confrontational atmosphere that envelops proxy contests or public
disputes about pay.15 There is an advantage to ceding board seats,
even when there is potential controversy over pay, because it defuses
tension between the company and the activist, before the issue
becomes public and affects the company's share price and market
reputation.
Ultimately, the case-by-case approach benefits corporations
because it is based around careful evaluation and communication
with activists, rather than on permanent, preemptive fortifications.
Unlike the corporate takeover era and the defensive strategies it
created, the activist era requires improvement in the communication
and interaction between the board and shareholders.11 6  In the
previously cited survey, fifty percent of respondents, including both
corporate executives and activists, believed that open dialogue and
negotiation was the best method for corporations and activists to
arrive at mutually desired results.1 7
Corporations and activists are coming to agreement more
frequently as boards and activists realize that, by opening dialogue
and making equal concessions, corporations can avoid long and costly
battles. Even the prominent corporate-raider-turned-activist-
investor, Carl Icahn, has remarked at being surprised at how easily he
has won board nominations in 2013, noting that "[b]eing admitted to
all these boards without a proxy fight would have been unthinkable
only a year ago." 1 8 This has been a part of a recent shift in the public
114. David Benoit, An Activist Investor, Minus the Fangs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2013,
http://online.wsj .com/news/articles/SB100014240527(P304672404579184203350711812.
115. Woolery, supra note 49.
116. James Woolery, Bridging the Chasm Between Boards and Shareholders, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 9, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303796404579099063750768
946?mod-WSJOpinionLEFTTopOpinion.
117. SCHULTE RoTH & ZABEL, supra note 16, at 4.
118. David Benoit, Companies, Activists Declare Truce in Boardroom, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527(P303330204579248501076906672?mo
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perception of activist investors. Some media outlets and regulators,
including Mary Jo White, Chair of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, have noted how activists have shed their corporate
raider reputation by focusing on thoughtfully bringing strategic value
to the boardroom.11 9 Instead of barring the door when activists
knock, corporate executives and directors have found that there is a
significant benefit in engaging in a cooperative dialogue with activist
shareholders.'20 The case-by-case evaluation framework can help
boards facilitate that dialogue, creating a diverse working group that
can partner with management to drive value.' 1
VI. CONCLUSION
Shareholder activism is an established practice in today's market.
Corporations and their boards must recognize that activist investors
not only are always going to be at the gates, but also may in fact bring
value to the company. While some corporations might choose to
resist shareholder activism entirely through long, public battles or
broad, prohibitive bylaws, others have found value by negotiating and
working with activists.
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right now, as he prepares for a proxy fight for seats on the board of eBay Inc., in his efforts to
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The policy arguments against sponsor compensation go to the
heart of corporate law: The fiduciary loyalty of the director cannot be
compromised. However, activist compensation may be a more
effective means of aligning the interests of the directors with the
corporations they serve. As such, corporations should avoid adopting
broad policies that prevent major shareholders from nominating
qualified candidates to the board.
Instead, corporations should consider the compensation offered
to these candidates on a case-by-case basis, giving activist strategies
proper scrutiny without overreacting to potential threats with broad
prohibitions. This approach ultimately preserves greater flexibility in
the corporation's internal governance and response to activists, and
allows the corporation to determine the best way to maximize its
overall value.
